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RELIEF FROM PREJUDICIAL JOINDER
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES (PART II.)
Lester B. Orfield*
III. RULE 14 AS INTERPRETED IN THE DECISIONS
A. Duplicity
1. Motion to dismiss
3 13
Duplicity may be objected to by motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b).
If objection that a count is duplicitous is not raised prior to or during the
trial, it is waived under Rule 12(b). " ' In one case it appeared that the defendant made his motion to dismiss for duplicity before his plea of not guilty.31
Dismissal has been granted for duplicity followed by a nolle prosequi of the
whole indictment, but the court pointed out that another prosecution was not
barred. " ' Alleging several ways of committing a crime in a single count was
often held not to be available as duplicity before the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and a court of appeal has pointed out that under
Rule 7(c) it should not be open to attacks under the rules."" Rule 7(c) provides: "It may be alleged in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that he committed it by one or
more specific means."
2. Motion to elect
Prior to the Federal Criminal Rules there had been several cases of motions to compel the government to elect for duplicity. Since the rules there
have been no motions to elect under Rule 14; however, there seems to be no
good reason for not proceeding under Rule 14 by way of motion to elect.
3. Motion for judgment of acquittal
Duplicity may not be attacked by a motion for judgment of acquittal."'
A.B., M.A., LL.B., S.J.D.; Professor of Law, Indiana University.

This is the second of two installments. For the First installment see 36 NoTRE DAmE
LAWYER 276 (1961).
313 Brown v. United States, 228 F.2d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 1955); Owens v. United States,
221 F.2d 351, 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Torres Martinez v. United States, 220 F.2d 740, 743
(ist Cir. 1955); United States v. Hood, 200 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941
(1953); Braswell v. United States, 200 F.2d 597, 599 (5th Cir. 1952); Gray v. United
States, 174 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 1949); Shockley v. United States, 166 F.2d 704, 709
(9th Cir. 1948); United States v. Bachman, 164 F. Supp. 898, 900 (D.D.C. 1958); United
States v. Raff, 161 F. Supp. 276, 281 (M.D. Pa. 1958); United States v. Bailes, 120 F.
Supp. 614, 617 (S.D. W.Va. 1954); United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012, 1014
(D.D.C. 1951); United States v. Brothman, 93 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United
States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 912, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); United States v. Greater Kansas
City Retail Cond. Ass'n, 85 F. Supp. 503, 510 (W.D. Mo. 1949); United States v. Chandler,
74 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D. Mass. 1947).
314 Witt v. United States, 196 F.2d 285, 286 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 827
(1952). The court of appeals concluded that there was no duplicity. See also United States
v. Richie, 222 F.2d 436, 437 (3d Cir. 1955); Torres Martinez v. United States, 220 F.2d
740, 743 (1st Cir. 1955); United States v. Lembo, 184 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1950); Beauchamp v. United States, 154 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 723 (1946).
315 Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 1949).
316 United States v. Potishman, 230 F.2d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1956).
317 Korholz v. United States, 269 F.2d 897, 900 (10th Cir. 1959).
318 Flying Eagle Publications, Inc. v. United States, 273 F.2d 799, 803 (1st Cir. 1960).
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4. Motion in arrest of judgment
9
Duplicity has been successfully attacked by motion in arrest of judgment,"'
2
but the motion has been denied, the court finding no duplicity present.
There is a doctrine of cure by verdict, 2' but, in one case, a district court stated,
although generally an objection to duplicity must be made before trial or by
motion in arrest of judgment, this is not true where the duplicity is more than
technical, if the crimes charged entail different punishments. A general verdict
in that case did not reveal of which crime the jury convicted the defendant.
It would have been prejudicial to sentence the defendant for the greater penalty;
hence the trial court sentenced the defendant for a lesser penalty, and denied
the motion in arrest of judgment. 2
5. Appeal
In one case a court of appeals considered the objection of duplicity on
appeal, although it was not raised below." 3 A dissenting judge adopted the
more usual view that duplicity should be raised by a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b) and, if not so raised, it is waived. 2 In two cases the appellate
court has considered the issue and found no duplicity. 23 The government may
appeal from a ruling of the trial court dismissing a count of an indictment as
duplicitous."s 6 The appeal is to the court of appeals.
B. Misjoinder of Offenses
Rule 14 "is merely a restatement of existing law under which severance
It seems
and other similar relief is entirely in the discretion of the court." '
clear that the rule applies where there is misjoinder under Rule 8 or improper
consolidation under Rule 13. It should be available where there is duplicity.
There is doubtless some overlapping with Rule 12 on motion to dismiss.
1. Motion to dismiss
Improper joinder of offenses is sometimes objected to by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12." The motion to dismiss "is in effect a criticism or chal319 United States v. Martinez Gonzales, 89 F. Supp. 62, 63 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
320 United States v. Selage, 175 F. Supp. 439, 440, 442 (D.S.D. 1959). The defendant
moved for dismissal prior to trial.
321 United States v. Poppa, 190 F.2d 112, 114 (7th Cir. 1951).
322 United States v. Shackelford, 180 F. Supp. 857, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) The court
concluded that a jury cannot find a defendant guilty as to one of the offenses charged in
the duplicitous count and not guilty as to the other offenses charged in the same count.
323 United States v. Lembo, 184 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1950). The defendant did not complain even on appeal.
324 Id. at 415. See also Flying Eagle Publications, Inc. v. United States, 273 F.2d 799,
803 (1st Cir. 1960).
325 Hanf v. United States, 235 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 880
(1956); Witt v. United States, 196 F.2d 285, 286 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 827
(1952).
326 United States v. Hood, 200 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1953). The government obtained a
reversal.
327 Ross v. United States, 197 F.2d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 1952). The court cited Pierce
v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896); and Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894).
See also Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 568 (4th Cir. 1959); Robinson v. United
States, 210 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
328 Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v.
Spector, 99 F. Supp. 778, 783 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
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lenge to the indictment." 2 ' One case held that an attack before trial for misjoinder of offenses and defendants "went to the validity of the indictment, not
to the question of advisability of separate trials." '

°

Improper joinder of offenses should be objected to before trial."3 1 If there
is no such objection, there is a waiver under Rule 12 (b)."' But a considerable
number of cases assert that dismissal is not the correct solution, but rather the
relief provided for in Rule 14, that is to say, election or separate trial. 33 Even
before the rules there was an increasing trend to hold against quashing or dismissing the indictment.
2. Motion to compel election
The granting of a motion to elect counts is in the sound discretion of the
trial court. In several cases election has not been required,3 ' but it is not
ground for election that some defendants are not charged on all counts. 5 In
those cases the counts were closely related to each other; the jury was instructed
not to consider the testimony as to the other counts. Where a defendant, who at
his arraignment moved to require the government to elect on which of five
offenses charged in the indictment it would proceed, but did not thereafter
suggest by motion or otherwise that trial on five offenses would confound him
in his defense (the charges were of the same general character), and the jury
acquitted the defendant on three of the five counts, denial of the motion for
election was held not to be an abuse of discretion. 6 The defendant should have
renewed this motion to elect at the close of the government's evidence or at
the close of his entire case. The court stated:
[T]he fundamental principle underlying the practice of requiring
the prosecution to choose between offenses or counts is the prevention of prejudice and embarrassment to the accused and if the
charges are of the same general character and are manifestly joined
in one indictment in good faith, the government should not be
329 United States v. Kidwell, 14 F.R.D. 399, 400 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
330 Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873
(1956).
331 Ibid.
332 Willis v. United States, 271 F.2d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (consolidation); Smith
v. United States, 180 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1950). But see United States v. Bernett, 140 F.
Supp. 373 (D. Md. 1955).
333 Kleven v. United States, 240 F.2d 270, 272 (8th Cir. 1957); Finnegan v. United
States, 204 F.2d 105, 109 (8th Cir. 1953); United States v. Northeast Texas Chapter, 181
F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. Connelly, 129 F. Supp. 786, 791 (D. Minn.
1955); United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511, 514 (N.D. Ill.
1954).
334 United States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
920 (1958); Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535, 543 (4th Cir. 1956); Warren v.
United States, 222 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v. Harris, 211 F.2d 656, 659
(7th Cir. 1954); Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Finnegan
v. United States, 204 F.2d 105, 109 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821 (1953); Ross
v. United States, 197 F.2d 660, 663 (6th Cir. 1952); United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D.
513, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Daigle, 149 F. Supp. 409, 412 (D.D.C. 1957);
United States v. Scoblick, 15 F.R.D. 183, 184 (M.D. Pa. 1954); United States v. Sherman,
84 F. Supp. 130, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 171 F.2d 619 (2d
Cir. 1948).
335 Ross v. United States, 197 F.2d 660, 663 (6th Cir. 1952).
336 Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105, 109 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821
(1953).
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required
to elect upon which count or counts it will proceed to
83 7
trial.
Where the offenses are of the same or similar character, they do not require election before trial."' If thereafter prejudice developed, there would
be material error, unless cured by election or other relief. There is no prejudice
where the defendant is acquitted on one count and granted a new trial on
the other. Election will not be required where the evidence under each count
is short, separable, and distinct," 9 nor where only one offense is alleged, such
as conspiracy. 4 In only a very few cases does it appear that election was
ordered; 4 ' a recent case in denying election pointed out that there was no
misjoinder and that no motion for severance had been made. 42
Where an information uses several counts to state an offense in a variety
of forms to avoid a variance, "the defendant may call upon the prosecutor
to elect" or seek a bill of particulars. 43 But where the counts state two distinct
offenses no election will be required. 44 In one case, where the government
admitted on appeal that certain counts stated the same offense, the court of
appeals held that the judgments under such counts must falln3
In another
recent case the court stated broadly: "the prosecution, seldom if ever, is required to elect upon which of several counts charging the same offense in various ways it will stand." 4 '
3. Motion to sever
Severance as to counts will not be granted merely on the ground that proof
under one count may be stronger than proof under another count. 47 Similarly,
neither will a motion to compel the government to elect nor a motion to dismiss be granted solely on that basis. Variations in the strength of proof do not
inevitably create unfairness. Separate trials of counts is a matter of discretion
where the counts relate to the same general class of matter.4 Where the defendant is convicted on only one count out of five, this tends to show that discretion was not abused. While severance may be granted even where the
337 Ibid.
338 Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
339 Maurer v. United States, 222 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
340 United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
341 United States v. Bucciferro, 274 F.2d 540, 541 (7th Cir. 1960). The government
elected the second and third counts of three counts for possessing and uttering counterfeit
money. The government did not nullify the election by introducing evidence as to the first
count as all the crimes were closely connected together.
342 United States v. Senior, 274 F.2d 613, 615 (7th Cir. 1960). In this case the defendants moved to dismiss or in the alternative to compel the government to elect.
343 United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 344 U.S. 218, 225 (1952). In
the trial court the defendant attacked by motion to dismiss. 102 F. Supp. 179, 182, 187
(W.D. Mo. 1952).
344 United States v. Kidwell, 14 F.R.D. 399, 400 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
345 Calvaresi v. United States, 216 F.2d 891, 904 (10th Cir. 1954).
346 United States v. Daigle, 149 F. Supp. 409, 412 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd, 248 F.2d 608
(D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958).
347 United States v. Sherman, 84 F. Supp. 130, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 171 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1948). It is enough that there is sufficient evidence to
take the various counts to the jury. Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 276, 279 (4th Cir.
1954).
348 Durden v. United States, 181 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1950). See also United States v.
Lassoff, 147 F. Supp. 944, 946 (E.D. Ky. 1957), where the court pointed out that the same
evidence would be involved.
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joinder is proper the moving party must show prejudice."'
motion for severance of counts was made after the trial had
the government had completed its preliminary statement of
dire;... severance was refused because there was no showing
but few instances has severance of counts been granted."'

In one case the
commenced and
the case on voir
of prejudice. In

4. Withdrawal of count from jury
The court may withdraw from the jury's consideration a count or counts
as unsupported by the evidence." This does not constitute a forbidden amendment of the indictment. For instance, two counts out of three were withdrawn
from the jury in the trial of Congressman Powell in 1960 in New York City.
5. Motion for new trial
Where a defendant fails to request severance of counts, he cannot later
move for new trial. 53
6. Appeal
If a defendant fails to move for severance of counts in the trial court, the
appellate court will not review,35 4 although occasionally the court of appeals
passes on the issue of joinder, even though it was not raised below, and finds the
joinder proper. 5 The appellate court will not reverse a ruling of the trial court
refusing to compel elections of counts or severance of counts unless it is affirmatively shown that the sound discretion of the trial court was abused. 50
7.

Habeas corpus
In a case involving guilty pleas the government contended that a violation
of Rule 8(a) could not be raised by habeas corpus. But the court did not rule
on the contention as it found that the joinder was proper. 7 In another case
the court considered the question on motion to vacate, even though no objection was made before or at the trial; however the joinder was found to be
3 58
proper.
Habeas corpus has been used to attack the constitutionality of joinder of
offenses. It has been held that charging a defendant with making unlawful sale
of narcotic drugs in eleven counts stating eleven separate offenses in a single
indictment, and trying him before one jury, does not amount to a denial of
due process of law; hence habeas corpus does not lie. 5 '
C. Misjoinder of Defendants
1. Motion to dismiss under Rule 12
In one case the defendant moved for dismissal of the indictment for mis349 United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
350 United States v. Trilling, 156 F. Supp. 462, 466 (D.D.C. 1957).
351 See e.g., United States v. Guterma, 179 F. Supp. 420, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
352 United States v. Segelman, 86 F. Supp. 114, 125 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
353 United States v. Segelman, 86 F. Supp. 114, 117 (W.D. Pa 1949).
354 United States v. Perl, 210 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1954).
355 Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873
(1956).
356 Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535, 543 (4th Cir. 1956).
357 Edwards v. Squier, 178 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1949).
358 United States v. Bernett, 140 F. Supp. 373 (D. Md. 1955).
359 Brandenburg v. Steele, 177 F.2d 279, 280 (8th Cir. 1949).
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joinder of defendants and offenses, and in the alternative for severance and
separate trials."' Many cases assert that dismissal is not the correct relief for
misjoinder of defendants but rather severance under Rule 14.61 Furthermore,
the possibility of prejudice from the joinder is cured by severance. 62
2. Motion to dismiss under Rule 48
Numerous defendants who are to be tried together may, like a single defendant, secure a dismissal of the indictment for delay under Rule 48(b) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."'3
3. Motion for severance
The government may move for a severance of defendants, 64 and, while the
court will balance the interests of the parties where- the defendant seeks a severance, it is questionable whether any balancing is necessary where the government seeks a severance. 65 It makes no difference that there will be some delay in
trying the defendants who are severed; but the government must show some
reason for the severance. The moving party's affidavit preferably should allege
the reason, although the reasons may be shown otherwise. The government
makes an adequate showing when it shows that the pattern of proof as to certain
defendants is much simpler than that as to others, and that evidence regarding
the defendants as to whom severance is sought cannot be available until after
trial of the other defendants. The government is likely to move for a severance
where some of the defendants become government witnesses. 6 The fact that
it is held that a defendant who commits a crime jointly with others may be
jointly or severally prosecuted in the discretion of the government'67 is of course
clearly connected with the rule that the government may move for a severance.
The trial court may on its own motion order a severance of defendants, 6 '
and if it later appears that joinder was not prejudicial, it can consolidate the
cases for a single trial. Even though joinder is proper under Rule 8, the trial
6
court is not relieved from its duty of acting under Rule 14 sua sponte."'
But most commonly severance is granted on the motion of the defendant
or defendants. By far the greatest number of cases under Rule 14 involve mo360 Heald v. United States, 177 F.2d 781, 782 (10th Cir. 1949).
361 United States v. Northeast Texas Chapter, 181 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1950); Rakes
v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 743 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948); United
States v. Harvick, 153 F. Supp. 696, 697 (D.N.D. 1957); United States v. Connelly, 129
F. Supp. 786, 791 (D. Minn. 1955); United States v. Mann, 118 F. Supp. 511, 514 (N.D.
Ill. 1954). But see Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 873 (1956). In one case in upholding denial of a severance the court referred to
both Rules 12 and 14. United States v. Soto, 256 F.2d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 1958).
362 Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 743 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826
(1948).
363 United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
364 United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256, 260 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v.
Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 1957).
365 United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 10, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
366 United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
367 United States v. Mimee, 89 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D. Mich. 1950). See also United
States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 10, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
368 United States v. Harvick, 153 F. Supp. 696, 698 (D.N.D. 1957). The defendants
asked for a dismissal, but the court ordered a severance. The case is cited favorably in a
dissenting opinion in Griffin v. United States, 272 F.2d 801, 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1959).
369 United States v. Guterma, 181 F. Supp. 195, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
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tions by defendants for severance of defendants. It has been asserted that an
application for a severance is "in effect an invocation of the right to a trial by
an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.""' Yet the granting
of separate trials to co-defendants is a matter of discretion."' 1 The trial judge
may therefore deny separate trials to three defendants charged with first degree
murder even where the death sentence is imposed on two of them. 7 2 Severance
is rarely granted in conspiracy cases because this would be impractical and expensive. 73 Severance as to conspiracy is not granted on a mere allegation of
nonparticipation in the conspiracy; 374 nor is it granted because the defendant
committed an overt act at some considerable time after the conspiracy began. 7
No severance need necessarily be granted as to criminal contempt when the
defendants are closely connected, 3 6 nor as to perjury where it does not appear
that the defendants must take positions contrary to each other. 77
Sometimes defendants will move for both severance of defendants and
severance of counts. In one case it was moved that there be a separate trial
of all defendants under the first and second counts; a separate trial of defendant
A under the third and fourth counts; a separate trial of defendant B under the
fifth and sixth counts; a separate trial of defendant C under the seventh and
and a separate trial of defendant D under the ninth and tenth
eighth counts;
78
counts.
A defendant seeking a severance should make the motion for severance
himself; he should not rely on a motion made by other defendants. If he does,
he is in no position to object on appeal. 9 It is not a ground of severance that
the defendant might have a better chance of acquittal if tried separately8 . or
370 United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
371 Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 243 (1957); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S.
84, 95 (1954); Maynard v. United States, 215 F.2d 336, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Edwards
v. United States, 206 F.2d 855, 856 (10th Cir. 1953). See cases cited at ANNOT., 54 A.L.R.2d
834 (1957).
372 Shockley v. United States, 166 F.2d 704, 709 (9th Cir. 1948). Accord as to first
degree murder, see Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Allen
v. United States, 202 F.2d 329, 334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 869 (1952); Hall
v. United States, 168 F.2d 161, 163 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 853 (1948). Accord
as to negligent homicide, see Simic v. United States, 86 A.2d 98, 102 (Munic. Ct. of App.
D.C. 1952), aff'd, 198 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
373 United States v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488, 493 (2d Cir. 1957); Duke v. United States,
233 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442, 457 (M.D.
Pa. 1958); United States v. Maine Lobsterman's Ass'n, 160 F. Supp. 115, 120 (D. Me.
1957); United States v. Silverman, 129 F. Supp. 496, 500 (D. Conn. 1955); United States
v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 184 (W.D. Pa. 1952); United States v. Klock, 100 F. Supp.
230, 235 (N.D.N.Y. 1951).
374 United States v. Dioguard, 20 F.R.D. 10, 14 (S.D.N.Y.. 1956); United States v.
Cohen, 113 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
375 United States v. Malinsky, 19 F.R.D. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
376 Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683, 689 (6th Cir. 1959).
377 United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Historically
there could not be joinder of defendants as to perjury. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM
ARREST TO APPEAL

263-64 (1947).

378 United States v. American Stevedores, 16 F.R.D. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). The
motion was denied. See also Herald v. United States, 177 F.2d 781, 782 (10th Cir. 1949);
United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. Bachman, 164 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.D.C. 1958); United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513,
524 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
379 Brown v. United States, 228 F.2d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
986 (1956).
380 Robinson v. United States, 210 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
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that severance is technically advantageous. 8 ' Where trial was by the court
without a jury, the trial judge was not required to grant a separate trial to one
of two defendants charged with violation of the White Slavery Act and conspiracy to violate the Act, in the absence of any showing of prejudice."8 2
A defendant seeking severance should make a showing that he would be
prejudiced by reason of the joinder.383 He might show confusion or undue
complexity. A defendant complaining of statements signed by co-defendants
should set out in his affidavit the contents of the statements; 8 4 if he claims
that the defenses are antagonistic, he should allege this.38 Where defendants
ask for severance on the ground of inconsistent defenses, no severance will be
granted if it is not pointed out wherein the inconsistency lies. 8 ' In a prosecution
for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act, severance was not granted on the ground
that the defense of one defendant would turn on freedom of speech and academic freedom, while the defenses of the other defendants turned on freedom of
the press."'
A severance will not be granted because a co-defendant has fled before
a former trial;... it makes no difference that an unfavorable inference might
be drawn from such flight. Conversely the co-defendant who had fled was
not entitled to a severance because he was being tried with defendants who had
previously been tried and convicted, but their convictions had been set aside.
It is not a ground for severance that various co-defendants have already
been convicted in a state court for the same conduct; 8 8 nor is it a ground for
severance that all the other defendants had past criminal records; 8 0 nor that
several co-defendants had already pleaded guilty to a separate indictment and
that another co-defendant had a criminal record;3 ' nor that one defendant had
been closely connected with racketeers and had gotten unfavorable newspaper
publicity when he was indicted. 2
Severance of defendants will not be granted merely because there is no
blanket allegation in the indictment that the defendants had participated in
the same series of acts or transactions. 3
It is enough that the indictment
reasonably construed so alleges. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure makes this harmless error.
381 United States v. Brennan, 134 F. Supp. 42, 52 (D. Minn. 1955).
382 Long v. United States, 160 F.2d 706, 710 (10th Cir. 1947). See also Edwards v.
United States, 206 F.2d 855, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1953).
383 United States v. J. B. Watkins Co., 120 F. Supp. 154, 158 (D. Minn. 1954). See
also United States v. American Stevedores, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
384 United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 151 (7th Cir. 1955).
385 United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 151 (7th Cir. 1955); Allen v. United States,
202 F.2d 329, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
386 Allen v. United States, 202 F.2d 329, 334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 869
(1952). In a conspiracy case the court denied severance for antagonistic defenses. United
States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 10, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
387 United States v. Fujimoto, 102 F. Supp. 890, 898 (D. Hawaii 1952).
388 United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
389 United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 185 (N.D. Pa. 1952).
390 United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 10, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
391 United States v. Stracuzza, 158 F. Supp. 522, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
392 United States v. Greater Blouse, etc., Contractor's Assn., 177 F. Supp. 213, 221
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
393 United States v. Welsh, 15 F.R.D. 189, 190 (D.D.C. 1953).

RELIEF FROM PREJUDICIAL JOINDER
Severance of defendants has occasionally been sought on the ground of
illness of the defendant seeking severance. 94 But, where the moving party is
improving in his physical condition, the court may reserve final determination
of the question of severance;"' 5 a court will not rule on such a motion until
the medical reports of the physicians examining him have been received. 9
A continuance or severance will be denied where the physician appointed by
the court gives his opinion that trial can be safely had." 7
Where several defendants are tried together, each has a right to testify
at the trial; he need not obtain the consent of the co-defendant and may testify
against him. 9 Such is the effect of the statut&99 providing that a federal criminal defendant shall at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent
witness. The trial judge may permit a co-defendant to reopen his case and
take the witness stand after both sides have announced that all the evidence is
in, even though the co-defendant's testimony tends to prove the defendant's
guilt. 0 ° The court in this case noted that the co-defendant had not previously
testified at the trial; his liberty was at stake, the court said, he should be allowed
to testify.
Judicial and extra-judicial confessions by a co-conspirator after the termination of the conspiracy are not admissible as evidence against a non-declaring
defendant.4"' But when joint defendants are on trial, implicating confessions
are admissible if the jury is admonished that such confessions are evidence only
against the declaring defendant."' The rule admitting confessions is based on
the notion that juries do in fact heed judicial admonitions, and that the effect
of the confession is therefore confined to the defendant who confesses. 40 3 Some
decisions admit that the admonition may have but little value,4"' yet sustain
the rule as assisting the judicial search for truth.0 ' But it has been pointed
out that such confessions are particularly untrustworthy and that juries are unable to follow the admonition. 0 ' Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Court, has
pointed out:
394 United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Severance was granted, but
later a continuance and severance were denied.
395 United States v. Foster, 81 F. Supp. 281, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
396 United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 190 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
397 United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
398 United States v. Haynes, 81 F. Supp. 63, 70 (W.D. Pa. 1948). Accord, Maupin v.
United States, 225 F.2d 680, 682 (10th Cir. 1955); Rowan v. United States, 281 Fed. 137,
139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 721 (1922).
399 62 Stat. 833 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1958).
400 Maupin v. United States, 225 F.2d 680, 682 (10th Cir. 1955). See also United States
v. Haynes, 81 F. Supp. 63, 70 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
401 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949), Fiswick v. United States,
329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946). See 72 H./v. L. REV. 920, 989 (1959); 56 COLUm. L. REv. 1112
(1956).

402 Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 1958); Corcoran v. United
States, 229 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 856
(2d Cir. 1951); United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 860 (1948).
403 Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954).
404 Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559 (1947) affirming, 158 F.2d 883, 890
(9th Cir. 1946).
405 See United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S.

860 (1947).
406' See the dissenting opinion of Jerome Frank in United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d
848, 857, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 946 (1951).
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Perhaps even at the best the safeguards provided by clear rulings on admissibility, limitations on the bearing of evidence as
against particular individuals, and adequate instructions, are insufficient to ward off the danger entirely. It is therefore extremely
important
that these safeguards be made as impregnable as pos4 07
sible.

In 1953 the Court held that the admission against all of the conspirators,
though not present when it was made, of a single declaration made after the
conspiracy had ended, was harmless error under Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure."' There were limiting instructions by the trial
judge. The Court seemed to say that use of the declarations was not a violation of the hearsay rule, provided there were limiting instructions. Only in the
absence of such instructions was the hearsay rule violated.
In Paoli v. United States,"9 where the defendant failed to move for a
severance, the Court held that the admission in evidence of a confession is not
per se prejudicial. It based its decision on the conclusion that, under the circumstances of the particular case, the jury was considered to have followed the
instructions. But the case seems to imply that, in spite of an instruction to disregard the confessions as to other defendants, there may be factual situations in
which its admission would be prejudicial. For example, there could be prejudicial error in a large conspiracy trial in which there are several confessions
each admissible as to only one defendant.
There were numerous comments on this decision, most of them critical. 10
Admonitions to the jury cannot completely cure the effect of an implicating
confession, the extent of the influence is always conjectural, and the circumstantial nature of the evidence connecting the defendant to the conspiracy
probably means that prejudice will ensue.41 ' Fine speculations as to prejudice
should not reduce the rights of a defendant;41 the federal courts should lay
down standards higher than those set by the due process clause;41 while juries
can and will follow many instructions, it is not reasonable to expect a jury to
obey instructions to disregard relevant evidence.414 Administrative expenses
should not deter severance, the risk of injustice being too high a price to pay
for economy of administration.4 ' The rule allowing admission has been clut407 Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559 (1947). See also the dissenting opinion
of Justice Frankfurter concurred in by three justices in Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232,
246 (1957). In Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949), the Court, in following
the rule that the declaration is hearsay, seemed to imply that all such declarations were inadmissible as a matter of law against the non-confessing defendant. See Note, 12 N.Y.U.
INTRA. L. REv. 106 (1957). But the defendant was being tried alone, and the statements
were not those of a co-defendant, but were extraneous statements of a co-conspirator.
408 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618-20 (1953). Three Justices dissented.
409 352 U.S. 232, 239, 241-42 (1957). Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas and Brennan
dissented, the dissent being written by Frankfurter.
410 37 B.U.L. Ray. 258 (1957); 43 CORNELL L.Q. 128 (1957); 24 U. CHi. L. REV.
710 (1957); 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 129; VAND. L. R.v. 859 (1957); 56 COLUMi. L. REv. 1112
(1956); 23 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 314 (1956); 2 VILL. L. Rav. 131, 133 (1956).
411 56 COLUmN. L. REv. 1112, 1114 (1956).
412 37 B.U.L. REV. 258, 262 (1957); 23 BROOKLYN L. REV. 314, 316 (1957); 10 VAND.

L. R V.859, 862 (1957).
413

43 CORNELL L.Q. 128, 134 (1957).

414

24 U. Ci. L. Rv. 710, 713 (1957).

415

Id. at 714.
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tered with a history of dissents and unfavorable commentaries.41 The Federal
Rules on Criminal Procedure should be amended41 to adopt the proposal of
Jerome Frank in his dissenting opinion in the case below:
When several defendants are on trial for criminal conspiracy,
if the government seeks to put in evidence an out-of-court statement by one defendant which is hearsay as to the others (i.e., an
out-of-court statement made after the conspiracy has terminated)
then (a) unless all references to the other defendants can be effectively depleted (so that the statement will contain no hint of the
other's guilt) and unless those references are deleted, (b) the
trial judge must (1) refuse to admit
the statement or (2) sever
418
the trial of those other defendants.
Another commentator has proposed that upon motion for a separate trial
by one of the conspirators the trial judge should hold a pretrial hearing.41"
Here he should determine if the government intends to offer in evidence declarations by one conspirator which cannot be used against the others, and, if so,
whether or not its reception would be highly prejudicial. If both questions are
answered affirmatively, the judge should order separate trials. If he refuses to
grant separate trials, then the highly prejudicial declarations should not be
admitted in evidence; if he did, there would be reversible error. In the view
of the author of this article these criticisms of the majority decision are persuasive.
A minority of the commentators accepted the decision as correct.42 ° It
should be presumed, they said, that the jury is capable of and does follow the
instructions of the trial judge;421 law enforcement would be difficult if the confession was left out. 22 The whole record of the case should be scrutinized to
see if there is prejudice; the admission furthers the search for truth; if the law
is to be changed, it should be by legislation.42 The majority holding "recognizes
the necessity of weighing the interest in admitting the confession as to the
declarant in a joint trial against the policy of avoiding prejudice to co-de424
fendants.
The government has sought to avoid the problem by deleting all references
to the co-defendant in the confession, and by substituting an X for his name
wherever it appears.4 25 But such practice may not be desirable;4 2 it may not
prevent prejudice; it may be dangerous
to allow the government to reveal only
27
certain sections of such a statement.
In non-conspiracy cases, also, confessions or admissions may be received
416
417
418

1957 U. ILL. L.F. 129, 132.
This is proposed in 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 129, 133; and 2 VILL. L. REV. 131, 132 (1956).
United States v. Paoli, 229 F.2d 319 324 (2d Cir. 1956).

419
420

10 VAND. L. Rnv. 859, 863 (1957).
72 H~Av. L. REv. 920, 990 (1959); 22 Mo. L. REV. 317 (1957); 33 N.D.L. Rzv. 317

(1957); 10 Sw-L.J. 205 (1956).
421 22 Mo. L. REv. 317, 320 (1957).
422 33 N.D.L. Rv. 317, 318 (1957).
423 10 Sw. L.J. 205, 207 (1956). But it would seem that Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure authorizes the federal courts to bring the rules of evidence up to date.
424 72 HARv. L. Rav. 920, 990 (1959).
425 See 37 B.U.L. REv. 258, 261 (1957).
426 Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 990 (1959); 24 U. Cmr. L. REv. 710, 713"(1957).
427 See United States v. Volkell, 251 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1958).
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from a co-defendant when the jury is instructed that the confession or admispion cannot be used against the other. It has been so held as to first degree
murder;42 where the court's instructions to the jury are not a part of the record
of the court of appeals, it will be assumed that the jury was correctly instructed.2 No severance is required where the co-defendant's testimony from
the witness stand is substantially to the same effect as his former extra-judicial
statement implicating the defendant."'
In 1955 a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted
a reversal of a denial of severance in a prosecution of two defendants for unlawfully receiving property stolen from the United States. 431 The court pointed
out that the circumstances connected the defendants so inseparably that the
jury could hardly return a verdict of guilty against one and of not guilty as to
the other. Reversible error was also committed in ruling in favor of the admission of the confession on the basis of the government's evidence, while denying
the defendant an opportunity to introduce evidence as to its involuntary character. There was an erroneous instruction as to the mental element. It made no
difference that there was an instruction to consider the confessions as evidence
against the co-defendant alone. The court pointed out that two trials would not
be very time-consuming.
In 1959 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit again reversed on similar
reasoning." 2 In a prosecution for violation of the Mann Act, an unsigned

statement given by a co-defendant (out of defendant's presence and hearing)
to an FBI agent was introduced into evidence. The statement accused the
defendant of being the instigator of each detail of the commission of each
offense charged. The sole reliance for defendant's protection from the prejudicial effect thereof was the court's instruction to the jury not to treat the statement as evidence against the defendant. Denial of a severance was an abuse
of discretion. It made no difference that there was enough evidence to support
the defendant's conviction apart from the statement of the co-defendant implicating the defendant. The defendant was deprived of his constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him, as he had no opportunity to crossexamine the defendant.
A district court held that the fact that one defendant made a statement
to the authorities in the form of a confession which also implicated his two
co-defendants does not entitle the co-defendants to severance and separate
trial." It may turn out that the statement will not be offered in evidence.
Even if it is offered in evidence, the trial judge may reject it if there was duress
in obtaining it. To grant severance would be in effect to decide that the alleged
428 Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (admissions).
429 United States v. Harris, 211 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1954).
430 Wheeler v. United States, 165 F.2d 225, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 829 (1948).
431 Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1955).
432 Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1959). The holding is approved in Falknor, Evidence, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 348, 349 (1960). See also Belvin v. United
States, 273 F.2d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 1960) where, however, one judge dissented. Compare
Alvarez v, United States, 275 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1960).
433 United States v. Needleman, 6 F.R.D. 205, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1946). See also Sharp v.
United States, 195 F.2d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1952).
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confession was admissable into evidence; pending trial to grant a severance
would be premature and unjust to the government. The court did not deny
that at the trial a severance might be granted. In one case, four defendants
were charged with keeping a gaming table; the fourth defendant was charged
also with assault with intent to kill and assault with a dangerous weapon. Evidence was introduced in defense of the assault charges, but none in defense of
the ganng charges, and counsel told the trial judge at the beginning of the
trial that he would call no witnesses in the gaming case. The trial judge was
affirmed in denying a separate trial to the three defendants not charged with
assault. 4 ' In another case, there was no request for severance, despite the
fact that counsel for both defendants had read a confession of a defendant and
were strictly warned that, short of severance, the trial court's instructions would
be the only way to insulate themselves from the effect of the defendant's statements. The trial judge gave a limiting instruction. The court of appeals held
that the confession of the co-defendant was properly admitted."'
Where the government offered certain testimony concerning a federal
agent's conversation with a co-defendant, but the defendant failed to request
the trial judge to give an instruction with respect to the scope of the testimony
and how it was to be limited only to the co-defendant, the court said the defendant could not complain on appeal of the failure of the trial judge on his
own motion to limit the scope of such testimony." 6 In this case the defendant
failed to object to admission of the conversations, failed to request that the evidence be limited to his co-defendant, and failed to ask for an instruction on
scope. In Kotteakos v. United States,"' the court restricted the trial of numerous conspirators for several conspiracies. This rule has been followed in numerous cases."' It has been distinguished in other cases."' 9
In one case the trial court, before the case went to the jury, granted the
motion of the defendants for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the
trial of 102 defendants in a complicated conspiracy case before a single jury
had violated the right to a fair trial.440 The courts did not even discuss the
possibility of trying the defendants separately. 44 As has been pointed out, this
raises the question whether, if it were not possible to try numerous defendants
434 Schewe v. United States, 184 F.2d 695, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Accord, Dauer v.
United States, 189 F.2d 343, 344 (10th Cir. cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951).
435 United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 856 (2d Cir. 1951). Judge Jerome Frank
dissented.
436 Dauer v. United States, 189 F.2d 343, 344 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898
(1951). See also Alvarez v. United States, 275 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1960).
437 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). See note, 57 COLum. L. Rav. 387,
401 (1957).
438 Brooks v. United States, 164 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1947) (convictions reversed).
439 United States v. Schaffer, 266 F.2d 435, 440, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1959); United States
v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 184 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir. 1950); Bridgman v. United States, 183
F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1950); United States v. Lev, 22 F.R.D. 490, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
440 United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 6 F.R.D. 526, 533 (N.D. Ohio 1948); Note,
21 TE-AP. L.Q. 280 (1948). See also Notes, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1046, 1050 (1955) and 72
HARV. L. REv. 920, 980-81 (1959); 57 COLUM. L. REv. 387, 403 (1957).
441 Judgment of acquittal is an extreme solution as the defendant cannot be prosecuted
again. He has been in jeopardy. Orfield, Motion for Acquittal in Federal Criminal Procedure, 28 TEmP. L.Q. 400, 409 (1955). It may seem harsh in such a case not to let another
defendant who had pleaded nolo contendere withdraw his plea, and plead not guilty.
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separately, they could be tried at all without violation of a constitutional
right.-4 But it would seem that they could be tried in groups.
In a prosecution for mail fraud, 27 were indicted, but only nine were
brought to trial, and two were convicted. Eighteen overt acts were specified
in separate courts. A court of appeals upheld the convictions,"' noting that a
single over-all plan of defendants was involved, justifying mass trial. In a
conspiracy prosecution against 46 defendants, severance was denied at the pretrial stage without prejudice to a renewal of the motion for severance at the
trial.44' At the later stage the court will consider a number of factors: Can
there be an adequate rapport between the defendants and their counsel? Can
the jury recognize each of the defendants and learn their names from the beginning of the trial? Will the requirements of a fair trial be frustrated by the
sheer weight of the number of defendants in the sense that only a prodigious
memory and a lively intelligence on the part of each jurror can fit each segment
of relevant evidence into its proper place? On the other hand, severance may
prejudice the government in having to reveal its case in the first trial for the
benefit of those tried later. The defendants are also placed in an unequal
position, as some gain the advantage of disclosure of the government's case
and the possibility of the death of witnesses or the fading memories of witnesses.
Later in this case 18 defendants were tried together and this was upheld on
appeal.44 Severance was denied where an indictment charged 23 defendants
with conspiracy to defraud the United States to obstruct justice and to commit
perjury.44 The agreement was on a single level for a single end; the same
evidence would be involved. A separate trial would have taken seven weeks.
Severance was denied where 17 defendants were prosecuted for conspiracy to
violate the narcotics laws."'
4. Motion for mistrial.
When two of seven defendants on trial had engaged in a violent alteration
with the United States marshal, and another defendant had been forcibly restrained from swallowing certain capsules, such occurrences were prejudicial
to the other defendants, and they were therefore entitled to a mistrial.4 ' Prejudicial comments of the trial judge also gave the other defendants a right to
a mistrial, even though counsel for the defendants did not object. Motion for
mistrial has been made because of introduction in evidence of a confession by a
co-defendant implicating the defendant." 9 The trial court need not declare a
mistrial on its own motion merely because the interests of the defendants were
442 Note, 68 HA-v. L. REv. 1046, 1050 n. 37 (1955).
443 Bridgman v. United States, 183 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1950). The court found that
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), did not apply to the factual situation
presented.
444 United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Likewise in a case
involving only eight defendants the trial court denied a pretrial motion for severance. United
States v. Lev, 22 F.R.D. 490, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
445 United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256, 260, 264 (2d Cir. 1959).
446 United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). There were also
36 co-conspirators.
447 United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 1960).
448 Braswell v. United States, 200 F.2d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1952).
449 Belvin v. United States, 273 F.2d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 1960).
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hostile."5" The defendant should move for mistrial if there is really a case for
it. A mistrial need not be granted because of a tirade by one defendant that
all the defendants had criminal records and because the counsel for one defendant asserted that his defendant had no criminal record.4 ' Instructions of
the trial judge to disregard would cure.
5. Time of attack on joinder
- A motion by the defendant for severance and separate trial should not
be made before the case is at issue;-52 on the filing of a plea of not guilty the
case would be at issue. On a pretrial motion severance will not be granted
on the ground that the confession of a co-defendant might be introduced at
the trial. 5 3 Such a motion could be renewed at the trial, but prior to trial the
court is without adequate information on which to rule; counsel are just beginning to familiarize themselves with the law and the facts.4" 4 Severance
should not be applied without knowledge of the consequences; otherwise it becomes a bludgeon which may prejudice the defendants and the government.
6. Motion in arrest of judgment
When defendants are joined who did not participate in the offense move
for severance which is denied, they may later move in arrest of judgment, 55
and for new trial.
7. Motion for new trial
Improper joinder of defendants should be objected to before or during
trial, or on a motion for new trial. If there is no such
objection, the defendant
45 6
cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal.
8. Appeal
If the defendants are advised of the possible conflict of interest between
them at the trial and they nevertheless proceed with common counsel without
any motion to sever, the appellate court will not find reversible error when the
facts do not indicate antagonism. 47 If the defendant made no objection to a
joint trial, or shows no reason why a motion for severance, if made, should
have been granted, the appellate court will not reverse.45 8 The appellate court
will reverse a denial of severance of defendants only if the trial judge abused
450
451

Goodman v. United States, 273 F. 2d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 1960).
United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 193 (2d Cir. 1960). Accord, Reistroffer v.

United States, 258 F.2d 379, 392-93 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 927 (1959).

452 United States v. Fujimoto, 102 F. Supp. 890, 898 (D. Hawaii 1952). Prosecution
was for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act.
453 United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 10, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
454 United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
455 Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1959).
456 Lelles v. United States, 241 F.2d 21, 23 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1957). A motion for new trial

was denied where a defendant and another were indicted for conspiracy and the defendant

had several opportunities to raise the question of severance for trial, but failed to do so.
United States v. Koritan, 182 F. Supp. 143, 145 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
457 United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 151 (7th Cir. 1955).
458 Siglar v. United States, 208 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1954). In Johns v. United
States, 227 F.2d 374, 375 (10th Cir. 1955), though no motion to sever was made, the appellate court reviewed, and pointed out that severance was discretionary.
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his discretion;459 there have been but few reversals for denial of severance.
Suppose there is a good faith joinder of defendants for conspiracy and
also joinder of defendants for substantive offenses; suppose also that the latter
joinder was improper; and that the conspiracy count is dismissed at the close
of the evidence, but there is a conviction on a substantive count. In such a case
a court of appeals refused to reverse.46 It would seem, however, that on seasonable application to the trial court that court might well have severed as to the
substantive offense, as there was no common participation of defendants'as
provided in Rule 8 (b) ."
9. Motion to vacate
A defendant who commits a crime jointly with others may be jointly or
severally prosecuted in the discretion of the United States Attorney.463 He cannot complain on motion to vacate, under 62 Stat. 967, 28 U. S. C. § 2255
(1958), that he was separately prosecuted. Joinder of offenses and of defendants is not a basis for a motion to vacate under this statute, particularly
where no motion is made for a severance of defendants, or to require the government to elect between counts. 4 The court reviewed the joinder, however,
and found it proper.
10. Severance and jeopardy
Suppose a severance is obtained during the trial of several defendants.
Has the severed defendant been in jeopardy? A federal district court has held
not.46 The severance was obtained so that the defendant could undergo immediate surgery; the government consented to the motion; the court could have
declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. The fact that there was a severance
instead of a mistrial did not increase the rights of the defendant. It was the
defendant who moved for the severance.
D. Improper Consolidation
1. Resisting motion to consolidate
Upon a motion of the government to consolidate indictments the defendant
may resist the motion. 6 The trial court will refuse consolidation where the
459 Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 651 (8th Cir. 1957); United
States v. H.J.K. Theatre Corporation, 236 F.2d 502, 506 (2d Cir. 1956); Duke v. United
States, 233 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Harris, 211 F.2d 656, 659 (7th
Cir. 1954).
460 Reversal occurred in Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1959);
Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1955).
461 United States v. Schaffer, 266 F.2d 435, 440 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'd, Schaffer v. United
States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960) (five to four).
462 See Ingrain v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 568 (4th Cir. 1959) where the court reversed a denial of severance. But see 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 158-60 (1960).
463 United States v. Mimee, 89 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D. Mich. 1950). The defendant
pleaded guilty.
464 United States v. Bernett, 140 F. Supp. 373, 374 (D. Md. 1955).
465 United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). If a mistrial is
ordered at the request of the defendant or with his consent, he may later be tried separately
for the same offense. People v. Mills, 148 Cal. App.2d 392, 306 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1957).
See Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 982 (1959).
466 Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d 23, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The motion to consolidate was made when the cases were called for trial. See also Mejia v. United States, 253
F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1958).
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basic evidence must necessarily differ in proving each of the individual indictments.4 6 ' Reasonable doubt as to the propriety of consolidation will be resolved in favor of the defendants; it is not necessarily the duty of defendant's
46 8
counsel to resist consolidation.
2. Motion to dismiss
Relief from improper consolidation is not by motion to dismiss, but by
motion to sever under Rule 14.469
3. Motion to sever
Severance as to consolidated indictments is in the sound discretion of the
trial judge.4 " A defendant is not entitled to severance merely because a codefendant confessed."' The instruction of the trial judge that the confession
of the co-defendant cannot be considered against the defendant prevents prejudice to the defendant. Where several defendants are involved, they are not
entitled to severance and separate trials if they might have been joined in one
indictment under Rule 8(b).472 Instructions to the jury as to the evidence will
protect the various defendants. A defendant may not have a severance where
first there was a single indictment against two defendants, then a supervening indictment as to one defendant to correct his name, and then consolidation of
the two indictments.473
Defendants cannot complain of mistrial in violation of Kotteakos,474 where
two corporate defendants and five individual defendants were charged in two
indictments with conspiracy and the indictments were consolidated." 5 Defendants claimed that seven conspiracies were charged, one in one indictment
and six in the other; but the court found that each indictment charged only. one
conspiracy. It should be noted that in 1954 in a civil case involving consolidated
condemnation proceedings the court of appeals reversed on the ground that the
volume of the trial violated the parties' rights to .due process.7 6 It was the first
case to take that position. 7 7
4. Cure by verdict
Acquittal of one of several consolidated indictments disposes pro tanto of
478
the claim of prejudice, though not in toto.
467 United States v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
468 Willis v. United States, 271 F.2d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1959). But see the dissenting
opinion of Bazelon, J.
469 United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511, 514 (N.D. Ill. 1954). In one case the
defendant moved to sever and to compel election. United States v. Martell, 104 F. Supp.
140, 142 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
470 Williams v. United States, 265 F.2d 214, 215 (9th Cir. 1959).
471 United States v. Howell, 249 F.2d 140, 156 (3d Cir. 1956); Cataneo v. United
States, 167 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1948).
472 Malatkofski v. United States, 179 F.2d 905, 909 (1st Cir. 1950).
473 United States v. Howell, 249 F.2d 140, 156 (3d Cir. 1956).
474 238 U.S. 750 (1946).
475 United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 184 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir. 1950).
476 Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954).
477 See note, 68 HAnv. L. Rav. 1046, 1049 (1955).
478 Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Dunaway v. United
States, 205 F.2d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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5. Time of attack on consolidation
A motion for severance made before any application by the government
to consolidate is premature." 9 In one case the motion to sever and to compel
election was made before the jury was sworn. 9
6. Continuance
Where an indictment against one defendant is consolidated with one
against another defendant, the defendant is not necessarily entitled to a continuance because of such consolidation. 48'
7. Motion for new trial
Where consolidation is by agreement with the defendant, he cannot later
object, as by motion for new trial."' This is particularly true where nothing
appears to indicate that the defendant was in any way misled into making
the request or that he was prejudiced by the consolidation.48 '
8. Appeal
Where the defendant fails to object to consolidation under Rule 14, he
waives the objection on appeal;48 4 but the appellate courts seem usually to consider the issue and find consolidation proper.4 8 Where the defendant's counsel
affirmatively expressed satisfaction with consolidation for trial of three indictments charging violations of the narcotics laws, the trial court acted properly
in permitting consolidation in the absence of any objection at the outset of
the trial. 6'
In one case, a defendant was convicted under two counts of two consolidated indictments charging embezzlement, and two counts charging obtaining money by false pretenses. The sentences on false pretenses were each
less than the sentence imposed on the embezzlement counts and were concurrent therewith; the convictibns on the embezzlement counts were sustained.
The defendant's contentions regarding the convictions on the false pretenses
counts were not examined by the court of appeals.8
The question of consolidation is one for the trial court, and its decision
will be reversed only for abuse of discretion." 8 Even though the trial court
479 United States v. Klock, 100 F. Supp. 230, 235 (N.D.N.Y. 1951).
480 United States v. Martell, 104 F. Supp. 140, 142 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
481 Gaudio v. United States, 179 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1950).
482 United States v. Nystrom, 116 F. Supp. 771, 776 (W.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 237 F.2d
218, 225 (3d Cir. 1956).
483 Smith v. United States, 234 F. 2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1956). One judge dissented.
484 Daley v. United States, 231 F.2d 123, 126 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 964
(1956).
485 Williams v. United States, 265 F.2d 214, 215 (9th Cir. 1959); Grant v. United
States, 254 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
486 Willis v. United States, 271 F.2d 477, 479 (D.C. 1959). One judge dissented.
487 Gibson v. United States, 268 F.2d 586, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
488 Johnston v. United States, 260 F.2d 345, 346 (10th Cir. 1958); Kansas City Star Co.
v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 652 (8th Cir. 1957); Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926,
932 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955); United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531,
535 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Harris, 211 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 803 (1954); Gaudio v. United States, 179 F.2d 300, 301 (4th Cir. 1950); United
States V. Rosehnblum, 176 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1949); Cataneo v. United States, 167
F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1948); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 635
(2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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would have been justified in refusing to consolidate, it does not necessarily
follow that the appellate court will reverse.489 But there is no discretion to
consolidate where multiple defendants are charged with offenses in no way
connected together."' The harmless error rule, Rule 52(a), would not apply

in such case.
9. Motion to vacate
Possibly to some extent improper consolidation may be reviewed on a motion to vacate under 62 Stat. 967, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958)." 9'
E. Severance for.transfer
What about transfer under Rule 21 of part of the counts set out in the
indictment of information? In a case arising under Rule 21(b) on transfer
of crimes committed in more than one district, transfer was denied because,
while conspiracy was committed in the transferee district, the substantive offense was not.492 The court pointed out that Rule 21 made no express provision for transfer of one of the separate counts stated in the indictment. A
district court in Maine took a similar view;493 on appeal the court of appeals
left the question open.494 The rule against transfer of part of the offenses makes
it easy for the government to prevent transfer by setting out an offense committed only in the transferor district. This is true as to prosecutions under Rule
21(b), but it should not be true as to prosecutions under Rule 21(a), as there
the offense need not have been committed in the transferee district. Perhaps
495
Rule 21, should be amended to allow transfer of part of the offenses.
But where the issue is severance of defendants rather than of offenses,
there seems to be more leeway for severance. A district court ordered a transfer from Maryland to Illinois even though two defendants opposed a transfer.499 The court ordered a severance of parties so as to transfer those defendants
497
seeking a transfer; the defendants objecting to transfer were not transferred.
489 Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1953). One judge dissented.
490 Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 569, 570 (4th Cir. 1959). Compare Griffin
v. United States, 272 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1959).
491 Etherton v. United States, 249 F.2d 410, 412 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 919 (1958). Nevertheless the appellate court seems to have reviewed the issue to some
extent, and affirmed the convictions. Violations of the law of the Territory of Alaska were
involved. See also Application of Dinerstein, 258 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1958), where the court
did review the judgments given after trial together.
492 United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 78 F. Supp. 409, 410 (D. Hawaii 1948). Accord,
United States v. Kimball Securities, Inc. 25 F.R.D. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But in United
States v. Tellier, 19 F.R.D. 164, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) where the court denied transfer on
the particular facts, it did not deny that in some cases there could be transfer of part of the
counts. In United States v. Choate, 276 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir. 1960), it was held that
there could be a partial transfer and the court of appeals denied mandamus against such
transfer. See Orfield, Transfer of Federal Offenses Committed in More Than One District or
Division, 51 MioH. L. REv. 31, 40 (1952).
493 United States v. Holdsworth, 9 F.R.D. 198, 202 (D. Me. 1949).
494 Holdsworth v. United States, 179 F.2d 933, 935 (1st Cir. 1950).
495 72 HARv. L. Rav. 920, 977 (1959).
496 United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., 79 F. Supp. 880, 882 (D. Md. 1948).
Transfer was denied in United States v. Tellier, 19 F.R.D. 164, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1956), on the
particular facts, and in United States v. Kimball Securities, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 172 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), on the particular facts. In United States v. Choate, 276 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1960),
five out of seven defendants were permitted to transfer.
497 An English writer has concluded that the transferor court should have power to transfer not only those defendants who wish transfer, but all defendants in cases where all shall
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It made no difference that there might be duplication of testimony; the court
permitted severance of parties for transfer, but not severance of offenses. The
court stated: "Also, these four moving defendants do not contend, and we
conclude that they may not successfully contend, that there may be a transfer of less than the entire proceedings as to them. That is to say, we conclude
there may not be a transfer of one or more, and not of all counts in the indictment as respects them."49' 8 But the court gave no reasons for such distinction. If the defendants may be severed, why not the offenses?49 The court
pointed out that there could be severance of parties as to a case not transferred, but it failed to note that there can also be severance of offenses as to
a case not transferred.
F.

Right to counsel
The defendant may be his own attorney at the trial of consolidated informations."' If so, he is likely to omit to take important steps to protect his
interests.5"'
While a defendant has the right to defend himself or to be represented
by counsel, he has no right to a hybrid of the two rights.502 A defendant who
was an attorney accepted counsel of his own choosing, subject to his personal
participation only as permitted by the trial court, which, at the time the defendant agreed to accept such counsel, indicated that the defendant should
not both testify and attempt to argue to the jury. It was held that he had made
a binding election waiving his right to defend himself personally, so that the
trial court's denial of his request to make the opening argument personally
deprived him of no constitutional right.
A defendant is not denied the right to counsel where he was assigned counsel six weeks before commencement of trial for conspiracy.0 3 He must show
prejudice from such denial. The court pointed out that he had had the benefit
of all motions made by the other counsel before trial. Where each defendant
has separate counsel, this tends to show adequate representation and a fair
trial.5 0 4 Assistance of counsel may be inadequate if so many defendants are
be tried together. Brunyate, The American Draft Code of Criminal Procedure: 1930, 49
L.Q. R:Ev. 192, 201 (1923).
498 United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., 79 F. Supp. 880 at 882. A single
case has construed Rule 20 as not permitting a transfer for plea of guilty and sentence when
several defendants are involved. United States v. Bishop, 76 F. Supp. 866, 870 (D. Ore.
1948).
499 Orfield, Transfer of Federal Offenses Committed in More Than One District or Division, 51 Mica. L. REv. 31, 50 (1952); Orfield, Transfer of Federal Offenses for Prejudice
in the District or Divsion, 27 TEmp. L. Q. 21, 38-41 (1953).
500 Smith v. United States, 234 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1956). See 62 Stat. 944 (1948),
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1958).
501 Id. at 388.
502 Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958).
503 United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 193 (2d Cir. 1960).
504 United States v. Schaffer, 266 F.2d 435, 441 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'd, Schaffer v. United
States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960). A defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of
counsel because during the trial his counsel entered an appearance also for two other defendants who were charged with the same robbery and also were charged with another
robbery committed the day before, where no conflict of interests appeared and the added
representation was assumed by counsel as a calculated move on his part to aid the defendant
in his defense. Wynn v. United States, 275 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1960). No inadequacy of
representation was found where four defendants tried for assault with a dangerous weapon

RELIEF FROM PREJUDICIAL JOINDER
tried together that there cannot be adequate rapport between the defendants
and their counsel.5"'
Failure of counsel for a defendant to object to consolidation for trial of
three indictments charging violation of the narcotics laws and to request instructions to consider the indictments and evidence separately does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."' 6
Counsel representing several defendants jointly tried, sometimes improperly try to prevent one defendant from testifying in order to protect the. other
defendant, even though the one testifying is also testifying in his own interest." 7 The error has been held cured by having the defendant called by the
government as a rebuttal witness, as defendant's counsel was unwilling to call
him.
There is no right to counsel on an appeal from a motion to vacate judgments of conviction of consolidated offenses when the court of appeals in ruling on the application could determine that the appeal was not taken in good
faith."' The court did not deny, or hold, that counsel could be demanded in
cases where appointed counsel is essential to permit the court of appeals to
determine whether the appeal was taken in good faith.
IV. MODERN REFORM PROPOSALS
Under section 185 of the American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure, if there is duplicity, misjoinder of offenses or misjoinder of defendants,
the trial judge "may order the prosecuting attorney to sever such indictment
or information into separate indictments or informations, or into separate counts,
as shall be proper." The section seems narrow as the concept of misjoinder is
not as broad as that of prejudicial joinder. 9 Section 312 deals more clearly
with prejudicial joinder of defendants. It provides:
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense,
whether felony or misdemeanor, they shall be tried jointly, unless
the court in its discretion on the motion of the prosecuting attorney
or any defendant order separate trials. In ordering separate trials,
the court may order that one or more defendants be each separately
tried and the others jointly tried, or may order that several defendants be jointly tried in one trial and the others jointly tried
in another trial or trials, or may order that each defendant be
separately tried.
were represented by' four court appointed attorneys for the group and no conflict of interest
appeared. Lebron v. United States, 229 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 974 (1956).
505 Central States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
506 Willis v. United States, 271 F.2d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1959). One judge dissented.
507 United States v. :Haynes, 81 F. Supp. 63, 69 (W.D. Pa. 1948). Compare State v.
Martineau, 101 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1960), noted in 51 J. CeiM. L., C.P.S. 240 (1960), and
45 MINN. L. Rav. 187 (1960).
508 Application of Dinerstein, 258 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1958). See Note, 26 U. Cm.
L. RV. 454, 455, 465 (1959).
509 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 316 (1947). To be contrasted with rules for relief for prejudice of joinder is the modem proposal for compulsory
joinder of offenses with the penalty of a bar to subsequent prosecutions, proposed in the
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute. See Note, 11 STAN. L. R!V. 735, 753-59
(1959).
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The section does not permit severance on the motion of the court, as does
Federal Rule 14.
The English Indictments Act of 1915 provides:
Where, before trial, or at any stage of the trial, the Court is of the
opinion that a person accused may be prejudiced or embarrassed
in his defense by reason of being charged with more than one
offense in the same indictment, or that for any other reason it is
desirable to direct that the person should be tried separately for
any one or more offenses charged in an indictment, the court may
order a separate trial of any count or counts of such indictment.51
The Court of Criminal Appeal will not interfere with the discretion unless justice has not been done.51 The court has pointed out that it is very undesirable that a large number of counts appear in one indictment. 1 Using
several indictments may increase the costs to some small amount, but this is
nothing against the possible danger of an unfair trial. The prosecutor should
be put to his election. Misjoinder of defendants may be made the subject of
demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment or appeal.51 The court may quash
the indictment. It may order separate trials. Where there is a joint trial it
is the duty of the court to warn the jury that the statement of one defendant
not made on oath is not evidence against the other defendant; but the prosecution is not under any duty to put in evidence selected passages only and may
put in the whole statement.51 Separate trials are sometimes granted where the
evidence admissible against one defendant would not be admissible against the
other defendants, or where separate trial would enable the defendant to call
for the defense persons jointly indicted with him, or the prosecution to call an
accomplice, or where persons jointly indicted for felony refuse to join in their
challenges. 1 5 Consolidation of indictments is not permitted even with the consent of the parties and a trial of consolidated indictments is a nullity.1 ' Duplicity
is usually attacked by motion to quash before the defendant pleads. 1 Demurrer
may be used, but is seldom employed. Motion in arrest of judgment does not
lie. But it is ground of appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act.
Rule 31 entitled "Prejudicial Joinder" of the Uniform Rules of Criminal
Procedure adopted in 1952 is like Federal Rule 14 in its first sentence. But
it adds a second sentence not appearing in Rule 14: "A motion for action
under this Rule may be made only before the jury is sworn, or, where trial
by jury is waived, before any evidence is received." The Second Preliminary
Draft (eighth Committee draft) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
had contained such a provision as to severance of co-defendants, but not of

510
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5 & 6- Geo. V. c. 90 sec. 5 (3).
R. v. Sims, [1946] K.B. 531; 1 ALL E. R. 697. See: KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL
LAw 556 (1958); ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 53-56
(1949).
512 Practice Note (Indictment [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1390, 36 Crim. App. R. 94.
513 ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 51-53 (1949).
514 R. v. Gunewardene, [1951] 2 T.L.R. 315, 35 Crim. App. R. 80.
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supra note 513 at 49.
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counts.5 s But the provision was deleted in the Report of the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court accepted the deletion. The drafters of Rule 31
apparently thought that severance after the trial had commenced might prevent trial of the defendant severed on grounds of double jeopardy.519 The
question of double jeopardy has come up in only one case construing Federal
Rule 14 and that case found no jeopardy.520 Furthermore increasingly the
federal cases involve severance during the trial. To require severance before
trial could greatly limit the utility of severance.

518 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 319 (1947).
519 The comment to Rule 31 cited Berge, Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
42 MICH. L. REV. 353, 364 (1943). Mr. Berge stated: "This rule suggests the question
whether severance after trial has started would prevent retrial of the defendant severed on

grounds of double jeopardy."
520

United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761, 764 (S.D.N.Y.

L. REV. 920, 982 (1959).

1956). See Note, 72 HAav.

